An Explicit Trust Model Towards Better System Security by Creado, Orhio Mark et al.
AN EXPLICIT TRUST MODEL TOWARDS BETTER 
SYSTEM SECURITY 
Orhio Mark Creado
1
, Bala Srinivasan
2
, Phu Dung Le
3
, and Jefferson Tan
4 
1
Caulfield School of Information Technology, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, 
Australia 
mark.creado@monash.edu 
2
Clayton School of Information Technology, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, 
Australia 
srini@monash.edu 
3
Caulfield School of Information Technology, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, 
Australia 
phu.dung.le@monash.edu 
4
IBM Research – Australia, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia 
jeffetan@au1.ibm.com 
 
ABSTRACT 
Trust is an absolute necessity for digital communications; but is often viewed as an implicit singular 
entity. The use of the internet as the primary vehicle for information exchange has made accountability 
and verifiability of system code almost obsolete. This paper proposes a novel approach towards enforcing 
system security by requiring the explicit definition of trust for all operating code. By identifying the 
various classes and levels of trust required within a computing system; trust is defined as a combination 
of individual characteristics. Trust is then represented as a calculable metric obtained through the 
collective enforcement of each of these characteristics to varying degrees. System Security is achieved by 
facilitating trust to be a constantly evolving aspect for each operating code segment capable of getting 
stronger or weaker over time. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Trust is an implicit commodity in the world today. We inherently trust our financial institutions, 
service providers, and even other motorists without any second thought. However, although 
synonymous, being trusted and being trustworthy are very different [1]. Trust as a human 
construct is extremely pliable; but this is not the same case when considering computing 
systems. 
Computing systems execute code that performs operations which produce usable outputs. Each 
instruction can be considered to be a singular operation. Therefore, a computing system can 
only be trusted and secure depending on the next instruction it executes. So how can a 
computing system rely on securing itself from itself?[2]. 
In this paper we propose a novel concept to alleviate the ambiguity of trust levels associated 
with executing code so as to ensure better overall system security. To achieve this goal, we 
primarily define trust in terms of a computing architecture; wherein, trust is no longer defined as 
a singular attribute but instead as a combination of characteristics which can collectively 
determine the overall trust level for any operating code. The aim behind this paradigm is to 
represent trust as an evolving concept within a computing system capable of growing stronger 
or weaker over time based on past operating performance. In our opinion, this is a significant 
step away from current models which advocate trust to be a binary outcome based on superficial 
constructs such as a valid username and password. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly covers some of the relevant 
literature in the area. Section 3 defines the explicit trust model architecture along with its main 
component - the trust engine, outlining the various trust categories and trust levels within each 
category and concludes with a real world application of the proposed model's theory. Section 4 
evaluates our proposal with a formal analysis of security vs. performance and provides some 
real world tangibility by using an asset centric threat model documenting some of the attacks 
pertinent to system security and how the proposed model aims at resolving them. Section 5 
concludes our work and provides directions for future research. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Trust, as a concept, traces its roots back as a psychological and sociological construct. In 
computing, its definition cannot be applied completely; as machines tend to be programmatic 
intelligence, the task of quantifying malicious intent becomes more challenging [3]. Bevan [4] 
proposes that with human-computer interactions there remain many variations of trust and trust 
levels; but not all of these levels can be accounted for in human-human interactions. Yet, 
computing systems have aimed to satisfy only a few of these variations at any one time, so how 
can security be achieved if only partial trust can be achieved? 
Trust in computing has been an active area of research for a very long time. One of the most 
prominent implementations of trusted computing has been the Trusted Computing Group's 
(TCG) Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [5, 6]; which used a cryptographically secure hardware 
to perform trusted software operations. A well-known implementation of this hardware platform 
was observed in Microsoft's Next Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) [7-11]. The 
drawback of this approach was that it tried to facilitate for a trusted area within an otherwise 
insecure environment. 
Alternative solutions include the implementation of microkernels as proposed by Setapa [12], 
and Heiser et. al. [13]. A good example of a hybrid approach between hardware and software 
policy has been proposed in the work of Nie et. al. [14]. The drawback with some of these 
approaches is that microkernels can be vulnerable during the boot phase of a computing system, 
and relying on hardware based solutions to implement security models is equivalent to no 
security if it is possible to compromise the actual hardware [15]. 
Trust can be defined as a concept with multiple characters [16], the challenge of implementing 
trust in computing has been the subjectiveness of the term ‘trust’ in relation to the user. This 
means that any operating code executed on a system can behave differently at different times 
depending on the user, the operating environment variables, and the desired outcome being 
sought. The determination of being trustable is still an open concern with human interactions, so 
why should computing systems be any different? Real world implementations aren't quite as 
simplistic, so as to be able to always consistency and accurately reduce the outcome of trust and 
security to a binary result. It isn't feasible, or possible, to account for all the possible scenarios 
which must have trusted operations defined. Modern day computing systems and their 
operations are never static, so why should the definition of trusted operations and trust in 
computing be? 
 
 
3. EXPLICIT TRUST MODEL 
Trust within operations in today's digital age is of paramount importance. Trust enforcing 
mechanisms with binary outcomes have become a single point of failure leading to the 
exploitation or compromise of a system. This section elaborates our proposal for explicit trust. 
3.1 Security as a Combination of Characteristics 
The more trusted the executing operations within a computing system, the more secure is the 
computing system. With this analogy, the explicit trust model defines a set of characteristics, 
each with its own set of properties, which can collectively determine the trust associated with all 
operating code within a computing system. It is important to note that although achieving 
absolute trust is not possible, it is quite possible to achieve near absolute trust through the 
correct enforcement of each of the identified characteristics and properties. The defined 
characteristics are as follows: 
 Invulnerable 
Invulnerability can be achieved through the reduction in the number of exploitable 
errors in operating code. This can be practically envisioned through the definition of 
secure programming languages, through secure coding practices, and through rigorous 
application testing. Furthermore, all code should be implicitly defined to handle all 
errors and be responsible for proper allocation and deallocation of resources. Properties 
include: 
o Defined Bounds: Ensuring that all input parameters comply with expected 
inputs, errors which exploit programming language vulnerabilities for input 
data types can be prevented. 
o Handled Exceptions: Ensuring that all output parameters produced comply with 
expected outputs, errors which exploit programming language vulnerabilities 
for output handling can be prevented. 
 Integrity 
Integrity can be achieved by having accountability standards in place for all operating 
code. As all usable code serves a specific purpose and has an author; a publicly 
verifiable metric, such as digital signatures, associated with the operating code should 
be provided so as to ascertain its ownership and ensure its authenticity to perform its 
intended purpose. Properties include: 
o Accountability: Ensuring that all operating code must have a valid and publicly 
verifiable digital signature which can uniquely identify the owner/author of that 
operating code and can also uniquely identify the integrity of the code. 
 Verification 
Being verified can be achieved through rigorous state management by the operating 
system. Virtualization technology employs similar aspects which facilitate the 
management of system state. By preventing unauthorized changes in system states, 
undesirable states of operation arising from unexpected exceptions in operating code 
can be prevented. Properties include: 
o Managed States: Ensures that all operations executing one instruction at a time 
do not forget the operating state of the calling instruction/process parent thereby 
ensuring the correct completion of instructions from start to finish. 
 
 Trustworthy 
Being trustworthy can be achieved through the proper definition of a calculable trust 
metric associated with any operating code. Initially assigned based on the credibility of 
its owner and post that, based on historical performance based on correct execution 
calculable via deterministic trust algorithms. Properties include: 
o Trust Levels: Ensures that all operating code must have a defined trust level 
which indicates its level of trustworthiness to the system and upon each 
execution is recalculated and modified accordingly based on the outcome of 
that execution. 
3.2 Identifying Trust Categories and Trust Levels 
To facilitate for evolving trust, the proposed model also defines a set of trust categories and 
underlying trust levels associated with each category. The purpose of these categories is to 
allow the trustworthiness associated with all operating code to either increase or decrease based 
on historical performance; thereby implicating higher trustworthiness for correct successful 
operations and lower trustworthiness for incorrect unsuccessful operations. The following trust 
categories and underlying trust levels have been defined: 
 Functional Trust 
This category outlines the basic trust requirements for all operations within a computing 
system. All operating system code, user application code, and network services code 
must have a trust level associated with this category. To allow for application 
scalability, the standardized constructs which outline the fundamental operations for 
each application can be application specific. Defines the following trust levels: 
o Operational Trust - Is required for system level operations, such as System-
system communication and high priority OS operations. 
o Verifiable Trust - Is the basic requirement for all operational code executed by 
the system or user to be verifiable and accountable. 
o Denied Trust - Is defined for operational components which are not verifiable 
and accountable; such as malicious operations aimed at exploiting or 
compromising the computing system, thereby completely preventing their 
execution on the computing system. 
 Transactional Trust 
This category is defined for operational components to constantly evolve their trust 
levels by serving as an intermediary between two functional trust levels. Trust levels 
under this category are deterministically calculable based on past historical operations 
over time. Defines the following trust levels: 
o Transitional Trust - Intermediate between verifiable and operational trust, 
facilitates evolution of trust for operations with good historical performance. 
o Untrustable Trust - Intermediate between verifiable and denied trust, facilitates 
evolution of trust for operations with detrimental historical performance. 
However, to support versatility and scalability, this trust level allows 
operational components which do not meet all the verification and 
accountability standards, but without significant operating history to deny 
execution, to execute within a constrained operating environment. 
 
3.3 Defining the Trust Architecture 
This section aims to integrate the defined concepts of the proposed security characteristics in 
conjunction with the proposed trust levels so as to define the explicit trust model's trust 
architecture. Traditionally computing systems allow for three types of execution modes: 
System, User, and Guest. Whilst beneficial, these modes do not define any level of granularity 
between each and often overlap based on the nature of operations. The proposed model 
advocates the requirement for a trust level to be associated with the operating code rather than 
the execution mode of the computing system. 
 
Figure 1. Explicit Trust Model Architecture 
Fig. 1 provides a conceptual definition of the proposed trust architecture. The architecture 
mandates that each operation must be able to satisfy each of the security characteristics by 
fulfilling their underlying properties. In a realistic scenario these characteristics could be 
satisfied only to a certain degree and therefore would allow the deterministic calculation of a 
trust level on a scale from no trust to absolute trust. For this purpose, the architecture defines a 
trust engine component which acts as an intermediary and facilitates the calculation and 
determination of the associated trust levels with each operation prior to execution. The last stage 
of the process is the execution of operating code under one of the execution modes facilitated by 
the operating system. 
 
 
Figure 2. Trust Engine Architecture 
The proposed trust engine is the most integral part of the explicit trust model, and Fig. 2 outlines 
a conceptual definition of the explicit trust model's trust engine architecture. The proposed 
workings of the trust engine will be defined; its practical implementation, at this stage, is out of 
scope of this paper. 
The trust engine serves as the common link which integrates the various security characteristics 
with the defined trust levels applicable to operating code. This is facilitated by specifying two 
calculable trust metrics for each block of operating code; the first being its functional trust level 
and the second being its transactional trust level. Prior to executing any operating code the trust 
engine facilitates the following process: 
 Verifies its associated functional trust level. 
 Verifies its associated integrity signature. 
 Determines operating mode and passes instructions for execution. 
 On completion of execution, it verifies the state management registry to ensure correct 
execution. 
 Depending on execution outcome, it updates the operation history registry. 
 Executes the trust algorithm to deterministically calculate a new transactional trust level 
based on the operational history. 
 Lastly, updates the operating code with a new functional and/or transactional trust level 
metric. 
We now define the various components of the trust engine architecture which facilitate the inner 
working process of the trust engine. The included components are: 
 Operating Code - Defines the basic set of operating instructions which need to be 
executed on a computing system. 
 Trust Algorithm - Deterministic algorithm which takes into account the number of 
historical executions, correct executions, incorrect executions, owner trust metric, and 
other key inputs to determine a trust metric for any operating code. 
 Standardized Constructs - Defined as an optional customizable add on to the model 
which would facilitate user or application specific trust requirements. 
 Integrity Verification - Verifies the integrity signature of the operating code against the 
hash of the operating code and the owner's public key. 
 Operational History - This registry stores aggregated historical operations for all 
operating code resident within the computing system serving as input to the trust 
algorithm's calculation. 
 State Management - This registry monitors the execution of processes and forking of 
parent processes to ensure desirable states of operation and complete execution of 
instructions from start to finish. 
 CPU - Facilitates for the processing and execution of operating code instructions; and 
accepts required inputs and produces any applicable outputs. 
3.4 Integrating The Explicit Trust Model 
This section aims to further the readers understanding of a possible real world application of the 
explicit trust model. Fig. 3 illustrates the step by step process of executing operating code based 
on the associated trust level. 
 Figure 3. Operational Trust Levels 
As observed in Fig. 3, all operations within a computing system can be reduced to operating 
code making the explicit trust model universally applicable to all operations, users, or even 
components within a computing system. By associating a trust level with each object it 
facilitates for a model whereby past operations dictate future access; thereby allowing for an 
evolving level of trust. 
System code is initially owned by its author/owner and once installed on the system changes 
ownership to the system thereby preventing all future modifications of system level operating 
code by any user. Updates to system level code would require verification of the original owner 
in order to allow for modifications of system level code files. By assigning an operational trust 
level, all operating code within this trust level definition would have access to all system and 
user level resources. 
System and user code which belongs to third parties are always defined with a verifiable trust 
level provided they have correct integrity signatures. The transactional trust level allows this 
operating code to evolve to an operational trust level wherein access to system resources might 
be required in order to perform system level operations. The transactional trust level determines 
the access to protected user resources and/or system resources. 
System and user code which consistently encounter errors or detrimentally affect system state 
are categorized with a denied trust level wherein all operating code with this trust level is not 
allowed to be executed on the computing system. To facilitate for operating code without 
sufficient operating history and/or without verification signatures the untrustable trust level 
allows for execution of these instructions within a protected environment wherein system level 
access is completely restricted. 
4. EVALUATION 
In this section we proposal a more formal evaluation of the proposed model for both security 
and performance. For real world tangibility, we also provide a concise asset centric threat 
analysis of the model with the emphasis on the computing system. Lastly we conclude the 
section with an objective discussion of the proposed theory. 
 
 
4.1 Security vs. Performance Analysis 
Let us assume that an operating code  is comprised of  lines of operating code, which is a 
total of  operations; such that 
 (1) 
represents the total number of operations for  lines of code where 
 
is the coefficient of the number of instructions per line of code. 
Eq. (1) therefore represents the default number of instructions to be executed without any 
additional security enforcing properties. 
The explicit trust model calculates security of the model using a probabilistic approach due to 
the inverse relationship between security and performance. We reduce both metrics to the 
number of operations being performed in order to deterministically evaluate the additional 
overhead. Keeping this mind we can represent the following: 
 , 
 
(2) 
where security is calculated as the probability of finding a single error in any operating code 
subtracted from the probability of code execution. 
Each security enforcing characteristic within the explicit trust model can further be enforced 
with the addition of additional lines of code to the basic set of operating instructions. We can 
transform Eq. (1) for each property to represent the total number of additional instructional 
overhead as follows: 
 
(3) 
where  is the additional number of lines of code added to  for property  
Accounting for each of the defined characteristics within the explicit trust model, we can 
transform Eq. (2) as follows: 
 
, 
 
(4) 
where each of the properties of Invulnerability, Integrity, Verification, and Trustworthy have 
been numerically represented. 
Fig. 4 outlines the trade-off between performance and security for the proposed model. The 
graph depicts the deterministic curve which defines the increase in security with a slight 
decrease in performance. Since all operating code must be executed in order to be functional, 
the depicted graph is directly based on the number of operations irrespective of the size of the 
executing code; thereby facilitating for the evaluation of the additional overhead required in 
terms of ascertaining additional levels of security for the minimal trade-off in performance. 
Furthermore, the evaluation methodology provides for an objective overview of a deterministic 
vs. probabilistic model; due to the nature of computing systems wherein performance 
degradation is the direct result of increased operations. However, lapses in security should be 
based on a probabilistic model; as the mere existence of a vulnerability does not imply 
exploitation without other key factors being supportive as well. 
 Figure 4. Performance vs. Security Trade-off 
Lastly, the proposed work allows for the determination of optimums so as to maintain the 
balance between security and performance to ensure the usability of a computing system 
without compromising user friendliness. Furthermore, the abstraction of security enforcing 
characteristics away from the end user ensures that security does not remain as an optional add-
on within a computing system. 
4.2 Asset Centric Threat Model 
In this section we aim to provide the reader with some real world tangibility by proposing the 
possible feasibility of the proposed model and its application towards preventing real world 
threats affecting modern day computing systems. 
4.2.1 Attack Process Flow 
Computing systems are processing stations for data - performing operations, and producing 
desired output or errors. Abstracted within this simplistic view is the attack path used to 
compromise the system. All attacks must exploit specific inputs so as to compromise a system. 
Figure 5 graphically outlines the perceived vs. actual process flow of an attack as it happens 
within a computing system. 
 
Figure 5. Attacker's Process Flow 
4.2.2 Threat Identification and Mitigation 
With regards to the defined attack process flow, we isolate and outline the various interacting 
component for the proliferation of trust within a computing system pertinent to our threat 
model: 
 Inputs - Are classified as data needing to be processed by the execution of some code. 
The issuer of the data or instruction, whether internal or external, is irrelevant to the 
operation and is therefore not an input. 
 Outputs - Post execution of any instruction, the computing system is capable of 
producing the following outputs: data, errors, or other processes. 
 Attacks - The following threats, applicable to system security, have been identified: 
service disruption, privilege escalation, data theft/manipulation, system corruption, 
protocol exploitation. 
 
Figure 6. Computing System Threat Model 
We identify five main attacks which target computing systems specifically, and represent them 
in Fig 6 to represent how they relate to our attack process flow. For conciseness we represent 
the threat mitigation process for these attacks in Fig 7 without taking into account the threat 
trees for each attack. 
 
Figure 7. Explicit Trust Threat Mitigation Model 
The proposed analysis segments the attack process into three stages: User, System, and 
Resource. Whilst majority of the actual process might happen at the system level, most attacks 
target exploiting the resource level by gaining access at the user level. The prevention of these 
attacks is proposed via the means of the trust engine's trust level determination process which 
can determine if each of the underlying security enforcing properties is satisfied. By defining a 
linear progression of characteristics for each operation within the explicit trust model, the trust 
engine facilitates for a semi-hierarchical approach towards the fulfilment of trust properties to 
ensure overall system security. The following are broad definitions of these attacks and their 
mitigations within the proposed model: 
 
 
 Service Disruption 
Are targeted towards disrupting basic operations; examples include denial-of-service 
and distributed denial-of-service. The exploitation is targeted towards the 
communication protocol used and the requirement to acknowledge and respond to all 
incoming requests. These attacks can be prevented by the integrity and verification 
properties of the explicit trust model. By validating dual authentication and ensuring 
state management for all processes these attacks can be circumvented to ensure that all 
systems communicating with the server can be identified and be held accountable for 
their actions. 
 Privilege Escalation 
Are targeted towards gaining unauthorized access; an example is a buffer overflow 
attack. The exploitation is targeted towards finding and exploiting coding flaws by 
passing modified inputs to overwrite memory registers. These attacks can be prevented 
by the invulnerability, integrity, verification, and trustworthy properties of the explicit 
trust model. By ensuring that all programming code has proper error handling and 
resource utilization code in place and by ensuring that all code has an identifiable owner 
who can be trusted via means of a trust metric associated with the application code. 
Furthermore, proper state management to ensure instructions finish in order can further 
prevent these types of attacks. 
 Data Theft / Manipulation 
Are targeted towards stealing user data or information; examples include viruses, 
trojans, spyware/malware etc. The exploitation is targeted towards covert exploitation 
under the pretence of some other legitimate operation. These attacks can be prevented 
by the integrity and trustworthy properties of the explicit trust model. Any operating 
code through covert channels would not be signed with any integrity signature; and 
furthermore, any default trust metrics associated with these would only be at the 
verifiable level, which would allow only protected execution thereby thwarting any 
system level exploitation. 
 System Corruption 
Are targeted towards rendering a system unusable; an example is bios corruption. The 
exploitation is targeted towards overwriting the master boot record thereby rendering 
the next start-up unable to load. These attacks can be prevented by the integrity and 
trustworthy properties of the explicit trust model. Any system level changes would 
require the original author's verification of the operating code. Code affecting the boot 
load process would ideally be required to have vendor integrity and trustworthy metrics 
assigned. 
 Protocol Exploitation 
Are targeted towards exploiting vulnerabilities in communication protocols; examples 
include ping of death, certificate forging, session hijacking, scripting etc. The 
exploitation is targeted towards system modification, disruption, or compromise. These 
attacks can be prevented by the verification property of the explicit trust model. By 
ensuring that all processes have a managed state of execution, any variations can be 
trapped and terminated so as to prevent undesirable states of operations. 
4.3 Discussion 
One of the biggest challenges in theoretical computer science is the evaluation of a proposal so 
as to ascertain the viability of the idea. Our approach to resolve this has been to provide a 
different perspective to the reader from a conceptual viewpoint with links to practical 
applications. Although some of the proposed concepts might seem like existing open challenges 
in the computing industry the proposed work targets resolving them from a more fundamental 
point of view which is the underlying source of the vulnerability rather than trying to propose a 
fix for any specific vulnerabilities. By adopting this approach, our goal remains to propose a 
model which can be independent of the underlying platform, operating system, application, or 
component. 
For conciseness of this paper, many proposed concepts specifically in the threat model's asset 
centric approach have been condensed; nonetheless, most of these are implementable via 
modifying the operating code for most commodity programs and signature verification is 
currently handled by most operating systems. By reducing our proposal to the most fundamental 
unit of operating code we allow for the definition of security enforcing characteristics by 
modifying the existing code. The mammoth task of fixing real world systems is perhaps out of 
scope of the proposed work; but the argument remains is that if we could fix existing issues we 
wouldn't still have them. The very fact that vulnerabilities still exist within computing systems 
points to the fact that the underlying infrastructure might need changing and although perhaps 
already in the works by big vendors for the not so distant future, this paper has aimed at 
providing a more conceptually sound, yet practically realisable model to further the state of 
secure computing. 
5. CONCLUSION 
If the existing paradigms for ensuring trust and security within computing systems were 
adequate, we wouldn't have as many vulnerabilities and exploitations of systems happening all 
over the world. Identity theft wouldn't be an issue, man-in-the-middle attacks wouldn't exist, 
and financial crime would be non-existent. However, that would be an ideal world scenario, but 
for now there exists a need for our computing infrastructure to evolve to the next level rather 
than patch existing technology with band-aid solutions which sometimes introduce new 
vulnerabilities in the process. 
In this paper we have proposed a novel approach towards promoting system security by 
ensuring trusted operations through the proliferation of trust explicitly. We reduce higher order 
systems to the basic fundamental units of operating code so as to be able to define a linear set of 
properties which collective define trust as a combination of individual characteristics, rather 
than viewing it as a singular attribute. Through this approach, we define a process for the 
deterministic calculation of trust levels based on the degree of satisfaction of each of the 
properties underlying each of the identified characteristics. By rendering trust as a deterministic 
metric calculable based on past historical performance, we facilitate for a paradigm of evolving 
trust within a computing system which can evolve to grow stronger or weaker over time 
depending on past executions. Furthermore, we evaluate our proposal for the trade-off between 
security and performance by alleviating the ambiguity between the deterministic vs. 
probabilistic approach by reducing both aspects to the number of instructions executed we are 
able to provide a more viable benchmark for comparison which is logically sound. 
In our opinion, there remains a large void for secure operations within computing systems with 
the growing diversity of devices and platforms. Through the incorporation of the proposed 
model it remains feasible to define security at the core of all operations within a computing 
system rather than as an add-on aspect dependent on the user. Our plans for continued work in 
this area include defining a framework for secure computing which is capable of incorporating 
trust as a fundamental component of its operation. We also have plans to publish our idea of a 
practical way to realize the proposed model within a computing system. Also in the works 
include the development of a deterministic trust algorithm which is capable of providing a 
calculable metric as a trust level using statistical and probabilistic models based on past 
operational history. 
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